Curiosity spends roughly 70% of the day "sleeping", in order to recharge the batteries from the nuclear power source. The system is designed to ensure the Rover goes to sleep and wakes back up to continue science and engineering activities. Additionally, the design is robust to off-nominal situations that may need additional actions performed by both hardware and software to ensure the Rover can communicate with the Earth. This paper describes nominal and off-nominal behavioral patterns, fault tolerance features designed into the Rover system (hardware and software), several off-nominal scenarios that are accommodated by the design, and some lessons learned from this development effort.
The Curiosity Mission & Background
The Curiosity Rover landed on Mars in August, 2012, and immediately started to study Gale Crater. Curiosity is an ambitious design, with many instruments, a driving capability, a robotic arm, and an articulating mast, all powered by a single 114 W Multi-Mission Radioisotope Thermoelectric Generator (MMRTG). The energy demands of the Rover exceed the energy production capability of the MMRTG. This fact made it necessary to create a system that allowed the Rover to integrate and store the generated energy over periods of time when the energy demands of the Rover could be guaranteed to be less than the energy production capability of the MMRTGs. We created an operational state of the vehicle called the sleep state. In this state, most of the loads on the vehicle are turned off, including the computer that controls the normal communication sessions and science gathering activities. While the loads on the Rover are off, and the Rover is functionally quiescent (asleep), the MMRTG produces sufficient energy to charge the two 43 Amp-Hour Lithium-ion batteries. When the Rover wakes up from its slumber and resumes its activities, it draws power from the MMRTG and from the replenished (recharged) batteries.
Given this sleep capability, the design was required to have a robust wakeup design because the computer is needed to communicate with Earth and to perform science activities. Communication with the Mars Reconnaissance Orbiter (MRO) or the Odyssey orbiter must be initiated at prescribed times, based on their availability. Direct to Earth communication must be done when the Earth is above the horizon. Science gathering activities, driving, robotic arm movement and imaging are usually done in the daylight hours, when the sun provides visibility and warms the actuators.
Additionally, the shutdown and wake up design was required to be operationally easy to use, because the Rover needed to shut down and wake up several times a day. The design was also required to be robust to a failure of any single device and the system needed to adapt to off-nominal situations to ensure that the operations team could regain control of the system. These guidelines led to two distinct behavioral design patterns that control the cadence of the Rover's activities over individual Sols 1 . The first such cadence is the nominal cadence controlled by sequences uplinked daily by the Mission Operators. The communication passes and science activities all fit into this general control pattern. This cadence is active as long as the Rover is healthy. The second cadence, a fault responseinduced cadence, controls the Rover's communication sessions and wake-sleep cycle when the Rover experiences a significant fault event. The primary components of the wake-sleep design are the dual Rover Compute Elements (RCEs), the dual Power Analog Modules (PAMs), and the dual UHF radios (Figure 2 ). The RCEs host the Flight Software (FSW) and control the daily activities when the Rover is awake. The PAMs contain the power control functionality (switches) that allows the FSW to turn various loads on and off (heaters, science instruments, etc.). Dual 1553B data buses allow the FSW to communicate with the PAMs.
Shutdown and Wakeup Process
Upon going to sleep, the FSW stops all of the FSW-controlled autonomous behaviors, turns devices off that are not needed while sleeping, stops the FSW modules from writing to FLASH memory, sets the alarm clocks in the PAMs (to indicate a planned wakeup time), and then tells the PAMs to turn off the switches that power the RCEs. When the alarm clocks expire, a Field-programmable gate array (FPGA) in each PAM runs a script to turn on the switch to the primary RCE. The CPU in the RCE boots up, the FSW initializes and the Rover is ready to roll. Figure 3 shows a timeline of a typical day on Curiosity. Sequences are uplinked to the Rover during the X-band high-gain antenna communications window, around 10 a.m. Science, arm movement, and driving usually occur during the middle of the day, when the sun has warmed the actuators and less heating is needed. Communication with the orbiters, via UHF, is performed between 2 and 5 a.m., and 2 and 5 p.m., depending on the orbiters' geometry. The Rover may be sequenced to wakeup during the night to turn on any of the overnight instruments.
A Day in the Life
During normal operations, the team sequences the shutdown using a single command. Upon receipt of this command, the FSW sets the alarm clocks in both PAMs to the appropriate duration based on the desired time to resume the sequence or the next communications window. If the next wakeup is for a communications window, the Rover will wake up, set up for communicating with the orbiter or directly to Earth, then autonomously shut down after the session has completed. If the next wakeup is to perform science, the Rover will wake up and resume the sequence where it left off. If a severe failure occurs, the vehicle is autonomously put into safing mode. A safing day (Figure 4 ) plays out differently than a nominal day. All the instruments are turned off, and the Rover sleeps whenever it is not attempting to communicate with the Earth or an orbiter. The Rover wakes up at 2 a.m. and turns on the ElectraLite UHF radio. When an orbiter comes into view, the orbiter "hails" the Rover with its own radio, syncing the communication, and the Rover sends up telemetry and receives commands. After the orbiter goes over the horizon, the FSW sets the alarm clock for the next communications window and puts the Rover back to sleep. At 8 a.m., the Rover wakes up and initiates a receive-only X-band window. At 9 a.m., the Rover turns on the X-band transmitter and sends a tone (with no telemetry) to Earth for 50 minutes. After that, the Rover returns to the receive-only mode to wait for Earth to send commands. At 11 a.m., it returns to sleep in order to recharge the batteries. At 2 p.m., the Rover wakes again to wait for a hail from the orbiters. The times and types of communication are configurable. 
Fault Tolerant Features
Given the need to sleep (to recharge the batteries) and the need to wake up (to collect samples and communicate with Earth), the wakeup-shutdown function was required to be single-fault tolerant. Our early analyses examined functional failure modes across all the affected components and examined the impact of the postulated failures. Then we evaluated the overall robustness of the design to the postulated failures. These failure cases ultimately drove improvements in the hardware designs and helped derive the requirements on FSW for the recovery actions needed to address unplanned fault-induced wakeup events. Oddly enough, many of the failure modes with the Rover's wake-sleep design have functional analogies in the biological domain. For example, faults could conceivably occur that could cause behavior analogous to narcolepsy (falling asleep unexpectedly), or insomnia (an inability to sleep), or sleep apnea (repeated unexpected wake events). Additionally, more prosaic, but equally important, fault modes existed that could be triggered in the wake-sleep control path or outside the control path.
Equipment
The PAMs are home to the capability that allows the RCEs to be powered off during a sleep cycle and they contain the alarm clocks and mission clocks that allow the PAMs to wake up the Rover at a pre-planned time, and also allow the Rover to re-seed its internal knowledge of mission time in a fault tolerant manner.
The PAMs contain a power management state machine that is coupled with a programming language that allows various intelligent and customizable actions to happen on each state transition arc. This intelligent control is stored in EEPROM within the PAMs, allowing the intelligence to be upgraded and enhanced as the design progressed. As the design progressed, this added intelligence became affectionately called the "lizard brain" of the Rover. The heart of this capability resides in an FPGA in each PAM.
FPGA design
Most of the intelligence ascribed to the PAM was implemented in FPGAs designed at JPL. The FPGA instantiated the following functionality: alarm clocks (with a snooze function), telemetry controller for a 128-channel analog front end and ADC, 1553B bus interfaces, Remote Serial Bus (RSB) interfaces, mission clock, nonvolatile memory storage controller, and volatile memory storage controller.
The FPGA design provides many fault tolerance capabilities. It incorporates logic to support SECDED (single error correction, double error detection) error protection of the volatile and non-volatile memory regions and write protection of the memory space under software control. The FPGA also supports the autonomous swap out of memory when a DBE is detected, allowing faulty memory to be replaced following a hardware memory failure.
The FPGA power management state machine (aka wake-sleep state machine) is implemented as a synchronized self-checking pair, to provide fail-safe protection against state machine errors. Triple Modular Redundancy (TMR) is used on all registers.
Each FPGA has two independently programmable alarm clocks to allow different reactions based on which alarm clock expires. The alarm clocks also incorporate a "snooze" function that attempts to initiate a wakeup after a programmable interval if the first wakeup event is not effective. The FPGA is also designed to send a wakeup signal to the backup PAM following a loss of power, power-on reset (POR) detection, or based on the internal detection of a power management state-machine fault.
The FPGA provides functions based on external devices. The FPGA can react to low battery or under-voltage indications, as well as "power positive" indications that may be used by a solar powered mission. There are two inputs for external wakeup signals, hooked up to the UHF radios, allowing each PAM to be fully cross-strapped to each UHF radio. The cross-strapping insures that the design is equally tolerant to PAM or UHF radio failures.
Finally, a watchdog is implemented in the FPGA to detect state-machine inactivity, which may be used to induce a wakeup, allowing the FSW to detect and isolate the problem.
PPROM language
The intelligence embedded in the PAMs is coded in a custom machine-level programming language native to the FPGA. The programming language includes traps for unimplemented instructions, improperly implemented instruction arguments, branch error detection mechanisms, and the capability to verify the integrity of the code base prior to execution of the code.
The code loaded into EEPROM is called "Personality" PROM or PPROM. This moniker is used because the behavior of every PAM on the spacecraft could be individually customized with actions appropriate to the PAM's functional role in the wake-sleep behavior. The PPROM code is triggered whenever the internal state machine is driven to a new state by detected events.
The hardware design provides four EEPROM banks for potentially four different sets of PPROM instructions. This is particularly useful when using different FSW versions. The FPGA will autonomously switch from the selected bank to a designated default bank if any of the errors described above are encountered.
PPROM design
The Curiosity PPROM design captures expectations regarding the nominal behavior of the RCE on wakeup and then takes additional fault recovery response actions if the nominal expectations are not met. The "expectations" of Rover behavior are really a conceptual model of how the Rover should behave in various nominal and off-nominal scenarios. In many cases the process relies on a closed loop handshake between the RCE and the PAM. An example of this behavioral model is illustrated during the process of a normal Rover wakeup. When the primary alarm clock timer expires, the PAM powers on the designated preferred RCE. The computer boots up and is expected to acknowledge that it has properly booted by clearing specific bits in the FPGA. If this action is not completed successfully in the two minutes allocated for the RCE to boot up, the PAM issues commands to turn on the alternate RCE. Two minutes later, if there is no acknowledgement from either CPU, the PPROM will turn off both processors, and try again, this time with the secondary computer first. If neither processor boots up properly, the PPROM will turn off both RCEs and set the alarm clock to wait five hours before attempting another wakeup. This allows the batteries to recharge before the next wakeup attempt.
Flight Software
The integrated dual PAM design is focused on getting at least one RCE turned on, especially since meaningful communication with Earth can only be done using the FSW. The FSW operating in the RCE is the fault detection, isolation, and recovery authority for most PAM faults. It is the job of the FSW to identify PAM faults, to take misbehaving PAMs offline, and to begin using the redundant PAM if necessary. Once the RCE is turned on and the FSW boots up, the FSW must read the breadcrumbs left in the PAM registers and isolate the offending PAM. The system then enters safing mode, as shown in Figure 4 .
Similarly, while the Rover is awake, the FSW must monitor the PAMs for failures and ensure at least one PAM is working before the system is put back to sleep. Additionally, the FSW is responsible for coordinating the communication sessions at the correct times as well as instigating the autonomous shutdown to ensure that the batteries will recharge.
Failure Scenarios
Given all the built-in fault tolerance, how does the integrated system play out? This section describes the autonomous response to several anticipated failure scenarios.
Inability to wake up -If the preferred RCE fails to boot and acknowledge both PAMs in the prescribed time, the custom PPROM code will power on the backup RCE. That RCE will boot up. The FSW takes over control and initiates safing mode.
Alarm clock breaks -If the prime PAM fails to turn on the appropriate RCE, either due to a failed switch or a failed alarm clock, the PPROM in the redundant PAM will power on the backup RCE five minutes later, using the redundant switch. The system will then enter safing mode.
Insomnia -If the Rover fails to go to sleep because a switch or FPGA fails, the RCE remains on. The FSW forces a processor reset (because most of the FSW modules have already been stopped by this time). When the FSW boots back up, if it doesn't detect another problem with the FPGA, it will attempt the shut down again. After a few resets, the FSW will put itself in isolation mode and the PPROM code will turn on the other RCE. When that RCE boots up, the FSW will attempt to turn off the first RCE and it will detect the stuck on switch. The FSW will run a fault response to isolate the broken PAM by removing the FPGA's power. Now that RCE will initiate safing and the system can go to sleep.
Sleep apnea -If the Rover can't stay asleep, the PAM turns on the RCE at the wrong time. While awake, the FSW checks the alarm clock settings and verifies that all alarm clocks in both PAMs are correctly counting down. If they count down incorrectly, the FSW isolates that PAM. So if the Rover wakes up early due to the oscillator running fast, the FSW will detect the problem and isolate the PAM. This type of failure leads to safing. Narcolepsy -If the RCE switch unexpectedly powers off while the Rover is awake, the PAMs are programmed to turn it back on within a minute. If that RCE's switch is permanently broken, the PAM will turn on the backup RCE. If the problem is with the prime PAM, the backup PAM will turn on the backup RCE using the backup switches. The newly "prime" RCE will initiate the safing mode following this type of failure.
Too busy to go to sleep -If the operations team forgets to sequence the vehicle shutdown, the battery control board will detect a low voltage on the battery cells and set a register. Autonomous FSW will run a system response to shut down the vehicle as fast as possible, setting the alarm clocks to 16 hours, which will allow the batteries to fully charge up. The system will be placed in safing mode on the next wakeup.
Run out of energy while sleeping -If the overnight instruments drain the batteries, the PAMs start a PPROM script in reaction to the under-voltage signal. This PPROM code will isolate any PAM with a potentially stuck switch, and then set the alarm clocks to 16 hours. When the Rover wakes back up, the FSW reacts to the undervoltage breadcrumbs by putting the system in safing.
Clock loses power during sleep -If the PAM experiences a loss off power while the RCE is asleep, the POR state of the FPGA's cross-string output asserts a wakeup signal to the other PAM. When the system wakes up, the FSW detects the POR signal in the breadcrumbs, so it uses the mission clock value from the "good" PAM, and isolates the PAM that lost power. This type of failure will lead to safing.
Clock runs fast or slow -With just two mission clocks available, it is difficult to distinguish which clock is right. Absolute time is critical to communicating with the Earth and the orbiters. So upon wakeup, FSW reads the mission clock from both PAMs and if they differ by a prescribed amount, the system enters a "hail wakeup" mode. In this mode, the prime UHF radio is turned on and left on while the Rover sleeps. When an orbiter hails the Rover, the radio asserts a signal to the PAM, which initiates a wakeup. When FSW boots, it starts to communicate with the orbiter. When the orbiter sets over the horizon, the Rover goes back to sleep with the radio powered on. The operations team may issue commands to the Rover through the forward-link capability of the orbiters during these communication sessions. This behavior allows the Mission Operators to wake up the Rover and acquire diagnostic data using an external orbiter-generated wakeup event.
Lessons Learned
The shutdown and wakeup system came together well, in part because a lot of nominal and off-nominal testing was done at all levels of development. We tested the FPGA first in a stand-alone configuration, and then the FPGA integrated into the PAM. In this configuration, we checked out the PPROM language and fail-safe features.
Next we unit tested the customized PPROM code for Curiosity and then a single PAM integrated with the FSW. Finally, we tested the dual PAMs integrated with the dual RCEs in flight-like scenarios, both nominally and inducing faults. The nominal wakeup functionality was tested daily because it was used to boot up the Testbeds as well as the real Rover in the spacecraft assembly facility.
Our Testbeds weren't all hardware-rich, but there was one Testbed that contained fully redundant RCEs and PAMs. This Testbed allowed full fidelity testing of all wakeup-shutdown functionality. Unfortunately this was also the only Testbed that could be used by the Entry, Descent, and Landing team, so there was a lot of contention for test time. The existence of this high fidelity Testbed was a huge plus. However, the contention for this test facility created scheduling conflicts and delays in testing. Having this high fidelity test venue was absolutely required. Having an additional Testbed with similar capabilities would have eased test congestion and improved overall schedule performance. The choice to not create an additional high fidelity Testbed was largely cost driven. The cost of new hardware was very well known. The cost of schedule congestion was not well understood. In the end, the decision was made to rely on only a single high fidelity Testbed. This proved to be adequate but painful. The lesson here is to have at least one facility that allows testing of the real hardware with its internal software and the FSW. Schedule-constrained projects with multiple independent development activities competing for the same test venues should seriously consider increasing the number of high fidelity Testbeds above the bare minimum.
Our greatest challenge was designing the FSW to correctly detect a specific fault, because the system design often assumed the behavior based on a few conditions; but when real faults were introduced, several unexpected symptoms would show up. Our original design used incomplete information that was misinterpreted by the FSW when the RCE was powered up following a sleep session. This led the FSW to turn off the switch that was holding up the RCE's power. In essence, this challenge resulted because the inherent complexity of specific fault cases did not match the simplified models that we used to describe the system and which were used in formulating portions of the fault protection design. This ultimately led to several upgrades in FSW capability as our models were adjusted to account for our deeper understanding of the complexities inherent in the fault scenarios that we were trying to address. The Rover's FSW at landing still had some issues with some of these failure modes, but we were able to prove that the system would eventually recover, if somewhat clumsily. Five days after landing, we loaded a new FSW version that fixed the wakeup issues.
Other issues in the wakeup-shutdown functionality were discovered after landing. The first step to shutting down is to stop autonomous activities. Unfortunately, the system does not stop all the autonomous activities (this was a system design miss). This ultimately resulted in the Rover leaving an instrument in the wrong state overnight. The lesson learned is to reexamine the autonomous behavior of the system several times during the design phase.
The wakeup-shutdown functionality was designed around two different assemblies (the PAMs and the RCEs) that could both control resources critical to maintaining the health of the entire Rover. When the RCE was powered off, FSW was not running and PPROM code was solely in control of the resources. When the RCE was powered on and FSW was fully booted, then control of the Rover's critical resources was passed to the FSW. Resource ownership and contention became an issue in several fault scenarios. An example of this was 1553B bus fault protection. In this scenario, communication between the RCE (FSW) and the PAMs could be interrupted for long enough to trigger one of the PAM's internal watchdogs. The PAMs autonomous actions could then interfere with the RCE's efforts to recover the 1553B bus. The resource contention and fault coupling that were inherent in the architecture of the Rover added to the complexity of the FSW that had to address these issues. Additional out-ofband signaling or control could have vastly simplified this process but the linkages were not understood soon enough to make the requisite changes in the hardware.
In-flight Experience
Curiosity has performed the shutdown and wakeup functions several times a sol, with no issues since landing, except on Sol 200. On that day, a couple of FSW bugs were illuminated when Curiosity's main RCE experienced a memory chip failure. The outcome was that the sequenced shutdown command was "locked out" so the rover did not start the shutdown actions. The operations team decided to swap RCEs by sending two hardware commands that forced the primary RCE into a mode where FSW isn't running. This action invoked the behavior described in the "Narcolepsy" scenario. Three minutes after the main RCE reset, the PAM turned on the backup RCE. When this RCE booted, it took over control of the rover and entered safe mode.
Conclusions
Given the planned mission duration, the Rover's entire wake-sleep functionality was designed to be completely single fault tolerant. When the final design was completed, the system is actually tolerant to individual failures in several redundant assemblies, since the control chain used to implement this functionality passed through more than one cross-strapped assembly. The final design is able to tolerate individual failures of several redundant assemblies in the control path as long as no two redundant pairs were both eliminated.
Testing proved to be best tool available for validating the fault-tolerant design. The single hardware-rich test venue allowed us to inject faults into the integrated system, and to see the behavior play out in a flight-like way. Adjustments were made to the FSW design to better react to the various faults that could occur while the rover was sleeping. Future projects with multiple complex development designs should consider increasing the number of high fidelity Testbeds to accommodate potential schedule conflicts.
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